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Abstract Discrete choice models of household location assume local
public ﬁnance variables remain the same within a given taxing
jurisdiction. Thus far, no such model has tested the validity of
this assumption. This study employs McFadden’s (1978, 2001)
discrete choice model to test for the signiﬁcance of dwelling-
speciﬁc local taxes and public services on household location
decisions within a single taxing jurisdiction. The ﬁndings
indicate that such variables are signiﬁcant determinants of
location decisions even within a single taxing jurisdiction, and
should not be assumed away. Failure to include such variables
in a model may, therefore, result in biased statistical results.
Introduction
The discrete choice models of household location decisions all have a common
assumption: local public ﬁnance variables, such as taxes and public services, vary
across different taxing jurisdictions but remain the same in a given taxing
jurisdiction. Thus far, no discrete choice model of household location has actually
tested to see whether taxes and public services are the same in a given jurisdiction.
This is an important point because if the statistical results do not support the
assumption, the estimates based on that assumption will be biased.
In this paper, McFadden’s (1978, 2001) discrete choice (multinomial logit, MNL)
model is applied to a single municipality that is coterminous with a school district,
and a test for the impact of dwelling-speciﬁc local taxes and public services on
household location decisions within that municipality is conducted. The results
show that such variables are statistically signiﬁcant determinants of location
decisions even within a single jurisdiction, and they should not be assumed away.
Failure to include such variables in a model may, therefore, result in biased
statistical results.428  Uyar and Brown
 Previous Literature
The household location literature has developed along two methodological tracks
(Nechyba and Strauss, 1998). Most of the earlier studies use hedonic price
models.1 More recent studies employ discrete choice models. Hedonic price
models are essentially capitalization studies and ‘‘it remains unclear to what extent
empirical evidence on capitalization can inform us about the importance of (such
variables) in (household) location choice,’’ (Nechyba and Strauss, 1998: 53). In
addition, the choice of a dwelling involves selection from among discrete bundles
of attributes and is, therefore, an ‘‘all-or-nothing’’ decision (Friedman, 1981: 348).
Hedonic price models cannot properly account for choices among discrete bundles
either.
For these reasons, discrete choice models are better suited than hedonic price
models for studying household location decisions. In discrete choice models, the
decision-maker seeks to maximize utility by ﬁnding the most desirable alternative
out of the many heterogeneous and discrete alternatives available (Earnhart, 2002;
and McFadden, 1978, 2001). Most discrete choice models of housing markets to
date have investigated household tenure decisions (to own or to rent) and/or
transportation choices.2 There have been relatively few discrete choice models that
have attempted to incorporate the impact of local public ﬁnances on household
dwelling choice. Even then, however, such studies3 have focused on location
decisions among ‘‘neighborhoods’’ located in different taxing jurisdictions such
as cities and even counties (e.g., Lerman, 1979; Friedman, 1981; Quigley, 1985;
Nechyba and Strauss, 1998; Chattopadhyay, 2000; Bajari and Kahn, 2001; and
Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2002). In doing so and as succinctly summarized
by Chattopadhyay (2000: 26), they have all made the same assumption concerning
the local public ﬁnance variables: ‘‘Characteristics, such as property tax rates and
quality of public services, vary across cities but remain the same within a city.
Similarly, within a city the neighborhood attributes, such as general standard of
living, vary across neighborhoods or census tracts and remain the same within a
given neighborhood.’’
This paper contends that this assumption oversimpliﬁes the actual decision-making
process and may have led to biased statistical results in the existing discrete choice
models of household dwelling choice.
There are several reasons why this approach oversimpliﬁes the actual decision-
making process. Households compare taxes in different jurisdictions. With all else
the same, a utility-maximizing household selects the jurisdiction with the lowest
tax burden, however deﬁned.4 Once a household ﬁnds its most preferred
neighborhood (however deﬁned) in its most preferred jurisdiction, its focus is on
identifying its most preferred dwelling in that neighborhood. This means that the
inter-jurisdictional differences in taxes are internalized in all the decisions already
made by that stage. Therefore, as is assumed in the literature, the household has
to take as given the nominal tax rates prevailing in the chosen location. In otherImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  429
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words, the nominal property tax rates are the same for all the dwellings in that
location. However, contrary to the assumption made in the literature, this is not
the end of the decision-making process where the local public ﬁnance variables
are concerned. At this stage, it is the effective tax rates (namely, the property tax
paid divided by the house price) that vary across the dwellings available in that
location and have to be considered next by the household.5 After all, each dwelling
implies a speciﬁc tax burden for the potential buyer. By the same token, while it
is true that the level and the quality of public services vary across jurisdictions,6
it is not necessarily true that the ‘‘public services remain the same within a city.’’
Even a casual drive through any jurisdiction or neighborhood often reveals rather
drastic differences in the delivery and quality of public services from one street,
or even block, to the next. Thus, even within a single taxing jurisdiction, a utility-
maximizing household selects the dwelling-neighborhood combination that
matches its most preferred tax burden-public service combination.
Thus far, no discrete choice model of household dwelling location has tested for
the statistical signiﬁcance of the differences in effective tax rates or public services
within a single jurisdiction. If the differences are statistically insigniﬁcant, then
the assumption made in the prevailing literature would be justiﬁed. If the
differences are statistically signiﬁcant, however, the exclusion of the relevant
variables from the model would bias the estimation results. Furthermore, if the
model is a nested multinomial logit model (NMNL), the bias would be transmitted
from the dwelling-level estimates to the other levels through the inclusive values.
This paper presents the ﬁrst discrete choice model that tests the impact of
dwelling-speciﬁc, effective property tax rates and local public services on
household location decisions in a single taxing jurisdiction.7 The results show that
these variables are statistically signiﬁcant; therefore, they should be included in
models of household choice rather than being assumed away.
The study area is a midsize municipality in the Midwest. According to the census
reports, it had a population of approximately 45,000 at the time of the study. It
is a single ﬁscal jurisdiction, and includes a single school district that is divided
into ten school ‘‘zones’’ for administrative purposes. Thus, school expenditures
per pupil are constant throughout the city. Families are required to enroll their
children at the school located in the zone where they live. The nearest urban
settlement of comparable size and employment opportunities is 75 miles away.
Thus, this municipality is treated as a single, self-contained job market and the
analysis controls for the impact on household location of a number of local public
ﬁnance variables while still including the school achievement scores, condition of
the streets and the effective property tax rates. The last two variables are the
dwelling-speciﬁc local public ﬁnance variables.
 The Model
In the model, a household (m) chooses a dwelling (i) and a neighborhood (n)i n
a single taxing jurisdiction.8 The objective of the household is to locate the430  Uyar and Brown
dwelling-neighborhood combination that maximizes its utility subject to household
income. The utility, Uinm, of any of the alternatives available to a household is:
U  V   . (1) inm inm inm
Vinm is a (linear-in-parameters, additive) function of all the measured, observable
characteristics, and inm represents the residual for the impact of unobserved,
‘‘unmeasured variables, personal idiosyncrasies, imperfections in perception and
maximization,’’ (Maddala, 1996: 68). If the inm are i.i.d. with the extreme-value
(Weibull) distribution, the joint probability that a household (m) will choose a
dwelling (i) and neighborhood (n) from the feasible alternatives (Sm) is given by
the multinomial logit model:
VV inm jkm P(i, n  S )  ee , (2)   m
j,kSm
where e is the exponential function.
Given its own needs and characteristics, a household’s perception of a dwelling
relative to the alternatives is based on two sets of attributes. One set consists of
the socio-economic characteristics of the neighborhood (Zn) where a dwelling is
located. The other consists of the attributes (Xi) directly associated with the
dwelling itself.9 These dwelling-speciﬁc variables include the structural attributes
of the dwelling, its accessibility to employment centers, and the local public
services enjoyed by the dwelling vis-a `-vis the ‘‘tax cost’’ implied by owning it.
As a result, Equation (2) can be expressed as:
X Z X Z in jk P(i, n  S )  (e ) e . (3)    m
j,kSm
Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the parameter vectors  and .
This model is based on the assumption of ‘‘independence of irrelevant
alternatives’’(i.i.a.). In other words, ‘‘the odds of choosing housing unit (i) relative
to (j) are independent of the characteristics of all other alternatives available to
consumers,’’ (Quigley, 1985: 43). McFadden (1978) and Quigley have shown
that i.i.a. may not be a realistic assumption in models of dwelling choice.
Unfortunately, Equation (3) itself cannot be used directly to test the validity of
the i.i.a. assumption. The proper approach is the nested multinomial logit model,
which is an extension of Equation (3). As Chattopadhyay (2000: 24) points out:Impact of Local Public Services and Taxes  431
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‘‘economic theory does not provide guidelines on the exact nature of appropriate
nesting hierarchies,’’ either (also see Quigley, Ibid). As a result, the validity of the
i.i.a. assumption and the proper nesting strategy in a given model have to be
determined empirically and together.
This study tested for numerous two- and three-level nesting strategies, using
various ‘‘neighborhood’’ designations to deﬁne the choice sets for the households.
They included geographic areas (census bloc-groups, census tracts), administrative
areas (school ‘‘zones’’) and a number of social and economic descriptors
(percentage white, percentage poor, median income, school achievement scores,
etc.). In no instance could the null hypothesis be rejected that i.i.a. holds for the
model. Therefore, i.i.a. is the maintained hypothesis.
 Data, Sampling, Variables and Empirical Results
Data and Sampling
The study has data for 710 dwellings sold during a two year period in a mid-size
city in the upper Midwest. The city is a single taxing jurisdiction, coterminous
with one school district. The sources of data include the city assessors’ ofﬁce,10
census tapes, the State Tax Department and the Ofﬁce of the Assistant
Superintendent of Elementary Education.
As recognized in the literature, computational considerations necessitate that the
number of alternative dwellings faced by a household be small; therefore, Equation
(3) is estimated by using a sample of dwellings taken according to McFadden’s
(1978) ‘‘uniform conditioning property,’’ (see, e.g., Bayer, McMillan and Rueben,
2002: 28–30; Chattopadhyay, 2000: 28–29; and Quigley, 1985: 45, 47–49). In
most of the literature, all dwellings that change hands throughout the entire study
period are assumed to constitute the set of dwellings available to a household.
Samples are then taken from this entire set, irrespective of when that household
may actually be in the market. In reality, the length of time from when a household
enters the housing market until it purchases a unit is usually a few months. The
dwellings available outside a household’s ‘‘transaction window’’ are irrelevant for
that household. By the same token, when an offer is made on a dwelling, it is
essentially withdrawn from the choice set available to the rest of the households.
As Lerman (1979: 85) states: ‘‘... the set of (feasible) alternatives (Sm) can vary
from decision maker to decision maker.’’ Thus, in order to reﬂect the market
conditions more realistically, the transaction window for a household is deﬁned
here to be three months. Therefore, all the houses that were sold anywhere in the
city are ﬁrst identiﬁed during the same month a household bought its dwelling,
as well as in the months before and after.11 Only these dwellings constitute the
relevant set of alternatives (Sm) for that household. Three dwellings are then picked
at random from Sm as the alternatives the household has ‘‘rejected.’’ McFadden
(1978) has shown that the uniform conditioning property gives consistent
estimates.432  Uyar and Brown







Area (sq. ft.) 1259.56 468.51 1272.16 469.03
Rooms 2.98 0.80 3.03 0.81
Age 36.80 28.46 35.44 28.56
Price ($000s) 56.10 24.24 57.01 24.30
Less than one full bath (%) 2.10 — 1.80 —
Basement (%) 81.80 — 82.70 —
Four-season porch (%) 17.30 — 15.80 —
Near river (%) 18.50 — 18.20 —
Gross income ($000s) 34.88 15.08 35.49 15.24
School and CBG Characteristics
Test score 7.00 0.24 7.00 0.24
Owner-occupied housing (%) 61.14 19.85 61.14 19.95
Non-white (%) 3.04 1.79 3.00 1.79
Below poverty line (%) 9.41 5.94 9.41 5.94
Median age 28.49 4.25 28.35 4.11
25 or older with 13 years of schooling 48.57 16.55 49.40 16.32
Some descriptive statistics for the chosen and the rejected dwellings resulting from
the application of McFadden’s sampling rule are presented in Exhibit 1. The
average dwelling chosen is 1,259.56 square feet and has 2.98 rooms. The ‘‘rooms’’
variable is for the bedroom(s) plus the family and/or the living rooms, if any. It
is 36.8 years old and sells for $56,100. In addition, 2.1% of the chosen dwellings
have less than one full bathroom, 81.80% have a basement, 17.30% a four-season
porch and 18.50% are located near the river. The average household has a (gross)
income of $34,800. [Household income was estimated by ‘‘backing it out’’ of
mortgage data, following Nechyba and Strauss (1998), among others.12] The
average school test score in the chosen school zones is 7.00.13 Based on the 1980
Census data, in the chosen census block groups (CBG), on average, 61.14% of
the homes are owner-occupied, 3.04% of the residents are non-white and 9.41%
are below the poverty line. The median age across the chosen block groups is
28.49, and slightly less than 50% of the residents who are 25 years old or older
have at least 13 years of schooling. Exhibit 1 shows that the descriptive statistics
for the rejected dwellings are quite comparable to those for the chosen dwellings.
Empirical Results
The results of the model estimates are reported in Exhibit 2; the results for the
complete model are denoted as Model A while Model B estimates the model withImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  433
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Exhibit 2  Dwelling Choice within a Single Taxing Jurisdiction
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15. Score  0.2457
(0.014)
0.782 — —
16. Effective property tax rate
(per $100 of house price)
 0.3957
(1.454)c 0.673 — —
17. Streets
(Paved with curb and gutter
Yes  1, No  0)
 0.6696
(3.571)a 1.953 — —434  Uyar and Brown
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Dwelling Choice within a Single Taxing Jurisdiction




























































































Notes: Absolute values of t-Statistics in parentheses below coefﬁcients.
aSigniﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
bSigniﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
cSigniﬁcant at the 0.10 level.
only a subset of the variables included in Model A. In Model A, variables 1–14
are for the dwelling, household and locational characteristics most often used in
the literature. There are two variables for dwelling size: the number of rooms
(excluding the bathrooms and the kitchen) and the average size per room. Their
coefﬁcients are positive and signiﬁcant. Households prefer houses with more
rooms but they also want the rooms to be spacious. The garage variable accounts
for the availability and the type of parking space. There are four categories,
ranging from no parking on the premises (category 1) to built-in, attached stalls
(category 4). The empirical results show that households prefer dwellings with
‘‘better’’ parking facilities. Dwellings that only have a three-fourths bath or whereImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  435
JRER  Vol. 27  No. 4 – 2005
the shower and/or the tub is in a room separate from the lavatory, are classiﬁed
as having ‘‘less than one full bath.’’ As expected, such homes are less likely to
be chosen than those with at least one full bathroom. Having a four-season porch
also increases the appeal of a dwelling. Age is a proxy for depreciation and the
need for possible upgrading that an older house is likely to require. The results
clearly show that older houses are less likely to be preferred. Dwelling price per
square foot of heated ﬂoor space is a proxy for dwelling quality, its style and the
various built-in features. As expected, households are willing to pay more for
higher quality houses with more built-ins.
The next three variables (variables 8–10) need to be examined together. Houses
that are ‘‘near (the) river’’ are those that the assessors’ ofﬁce has coded to be
located in the ‘‘ﬂood zone.’’14 Virtually all such dwellings are located within easy
walking distance (a hundred to a hundred and ﬁfty yards) of the river. While being
in a ﬂood zone may be of concern, there are also some obvious amenities
associated with being near a river, such as the opportunities for sailing, ﬁshing,
picnicking and, for some dwellings, the view. The empirical results indicate that
the attraction of locational features outweighs households’ concerns regarding the
threat of a ﬂood. This is not at all surprising. After all, for most people ﬂooding
is only a remote possibility whereas environmental features are tangible and
always there. Most homes in the city have basements and, by itself, whether or
not a dwelling has a basement is not a statistically signiﬁcant factor in the
decision-making process. When the basement variable is interacted with ‘‘near
(the) river,’’ however, the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant and negative. In general, houses
with basements are more vulnerable to even minor ﬂooding through the basement
and the results show that where houses near the river are concerned, households
prefer units with no basements.
Net household income is the income left for non-housing expenditures after
property taxes, home insurance premiums, principle and ﬁnance charges are paid.15
The results show that households prefer higher net income (that is, higher income
or lower housing expenditures) but as the sign of the squared net income variable
shows, at a decreasing rate.
The access variable is a gravity-type accessibility index. The access index is
derived for each dwelling by normalizing ‘‘the sum of (a dwelling’s) relative
accessibility’’ over all three employment-shopping-entertainment centers in the
city.16 The normalization factor is the sum of the taxable sales at these centers.
All else equal, the index is inversely related to distance. The results show that
given that this is a rather small jurisdiction; households in general prefer dwellings
that are on the average farther from the relative congestion of the employment-
shopping-entertainment centers. However, there is also a trade-off with net
income; households prefer homes closer to these centers if close proximity entails
lower housing costs (and, therefore, higher discretionary income). These results
are consistent with the development patterns in the city. Newer and better homes
form a ring around the city. As a result, the congested inner circle has emerged
as the home to dwellings that are in general older, smaller and cheaper.436  Uyar and Brown
Variables 15–17 are the local public ﬁnance variables. First, the analysis examines
the impact of school ‘quality’ on dwelling choice. The city consists of a single
school district. For administrative purposes, it is divided into ten school zones.
Children are required to attend the school located in the zone where they reside.
Since the city is the school district, school expenditures per pupil are the same
across all schools and school zones. The variable for school quality is the school
test score. Exhibit 1 shows that the variable is statistically insigniﬁcant, which
is not unexpected. The municipality is rather homogeneous in its ethnic,
socioeconomic make-up. As can be seen from Exhibit 1, the ‘‘disadvantaged’’
constitute a relatively small percentage of the population. Since the entire city is
one school district, competition for resources is not the issue it might have been
had there been several school districts. Perhaps as a result, households do not
consider ‘‘score’’ to be a signiﬁcant factor in their location decisions.
The other two local public ﬁnance variables are the dwelling-speciﬁc variables.
The effective property tax rate is the property tax paid per one hundred dollar of
purchase price. As expected, with everything else the same, a higher effective
property tax rate makes a dwelling less desirable. Obviously households are
sensitive to the tax burden associated with each individual house in their choice
set. The variable streets refers to the condition of the street on which a house is
located. Perhaps the most tangible indicator of dwelling-speciﬁc differences in the
quality and delivery of public services in any neighborhood is the output of the
public works department, namely, the condition of the streets, curbs, gutters and
sidewalks. Exhibit 2 shows that being on a paved street (with curb and gutter)
makes a dwelling more desirable than dwellings located on other types of streets
(not paved and/or without a curb or gutter). These results show that even though
the city in question is a single taxing jurisdiction with the local nominal tax rates
the same for everyone, households still respond to differences in effective tax rates
across housing units. In addition, if households perceive property taxes they pay
as their share of the ‘‘price’’ for municipal services, they may view the condition
of their street as the most immediately apparent indicator of the ‘‘quality’’ of
public services they are purchasing in return. These results underscore the
importance of testing for the signiﬁcance of such variables even at the level of a
single taxing jurisdiction in discrete choice models.
The impact on the household location decision has also been tested on a number
of neighborhood variables at the level of census block groups and school zones,
respectively. The variables included: the percentage of owner-occupied housing,
the percentage of nonwhites, the percentage of people below the poverty level,
median income, median age and the percentage of people with at least one year
of college education. None were statistically signiﬁcant. Since this is a rather small
municipality, crime statistics were not available for the individual neighborhoods
in the city; however, the city itself is rated as a ‘‘safe’’ one. There are more than
half a dozen parks (green areas) within the municipal boundaries, rendering
proximity-to-parks irrelevant as a determinant of dwelling choice. In addition,
‘‘ﬁxed’’ neighborhood effects were also tested for at the level of census blockImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  437
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groups and school zones. They were not statistically signiﬁcant either. As an
example, the results for the school zones are included in Exhibit 2. Variables 18–
26 are the nine dummy variables for the ﬁxed neighborhood affects associated
with the ten school zones.17
For comparison, Exhibit 2 also presents the results for the model (Model B)
without the three local public ﬁnance variables: the effective property tax rate, the
streets and the score variables. Model B is the model that would have been
estimated in this study if the literature had been followed and had assumed that
the local public ﬁnance variables remain the same in a given taxing jurisdiction.
When the individual coefﬁcients are compared across the two models, there are
two differences worth mentioning. One is that the access variable is insigniﬁcant
in Model B but is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in Model A. The other is that the
dummy variable for neighborhood 8 is signiﬁcant at the 10% level in Model B
but is not signiﬁcant in Model A. Otherwise, the rest of the empirical results for
the individual coefﬁcients across the two models are comparable, indicating that
the results are relatively robust with respect to the local public ﬁnance variables.
When the aggregate statistics are compared across the two models, Model A has
a higher log-likelihood statistic than Model B, as expected. Model B is Model A
with three coefﬁcients restricted to be equal to zero. A likelihood ratio test can
be used to determine if Model A is a statistically signiﬁcant improvement over
Model B. The likelihood ratio statistic is 2*[608.70  (600.87)], which is
15.66. This test statistic has a chi-square distribution with 3 d.f. At a 0.01 level
of signiﬁcance, the critical chi-square is 11.35. Thus, Model A is a statistically
signiﬁcant improvement over Model B.18 This indicates that the local public
ﬁnance variables improve the aggregate statistics in our model. These results
support the contention that the local public ﬁnance variables could be signiﬁcant
determinants of location decisions even in a single taxing jurisdiction, and they
should not be assumed away without testing.
The coefﬁcients in multinomial logit models are not easy to interpret. As discussed
in Allison (1999, Ch. 7), the empirical results can be related to the ‘‘odds ratios,’’
which are also presented in Exhibit 2. The odds ratios are the exponents of the
original coefﬁcients. For example, the variable four-season porch assumes a value
of 1 or 0 depending on whether a dwelling has such a porch. Looking at Model
A, its odds ratio is 1.428. Thus, the model predicts that all else equal, the odds
that a house with a four-season porch will be chosen are 1.428 times the odds for
a house without one; in other words, the odds of it being selected are almost 43%
higher. The bathroom variable is assigned a value of 1 for a house with no full
bathroom and 0 otherwise. Its odds ratio is 0.490. This implies that the odds that
a house without a full bathroom will be chosen are 51% lower than the odds that
a house with at least one full bath will be chosen. The best way to interpret the
odds ratio for nonbinary variables is by subtracting 1 from the odds ratio and
multiplying the result by 100. ‘‘This tells us the percentage change in the odds
for each unit increase in the independent variable.’’19 For instance, we see from
Exhibit 2 that the odds ratio for the variable average size per room is 1.936.438  Uyar and Brown
This indicates that a one-unit (i.e., one hundred square foot) increase in average
room size is predicted to increase the odds that a dwelling will be chosen by
almost 94%. The model also predicts that each one-year increment in the age of
a house will lower the odds it will be chosen by 1.6% [ (0.984  1)*100]. By
the same token, with all else the same, a one-unit (i.e., $100) difference in net
income (equivalent to a hundred dollar difference in housing expenditures) is
predicted to affect the odds that a dwelling will be chosen by slightly more than
27%. Given that the median net household income (not shown in Exhibit 1) in
the sample is approximately $25,500, a $100 difference in income left over for
non-housing expenses represents a substantial amount. The rest of the odds ratios
can all be interpreted the same way.
Given the objectives of this study, the odds ratios for the two dwelling-speciﬁc
local public ﬁnance variables are particularly informative. For the effective
property tax variable, the odds ratio is 0.673. This indicates that a dollar difference
in property tax paid per $100 of house value affects the odds that a dwelling will
be chosen by almost 33%. On the surface, this appears to be unrealistically high.
However, the average value of a house in the sample is approximately $56,000.
With all else the same, a $1 difference in the effective tax rates would imply a
difference of $560 in the annual property taxes of two average priced dwellings.
Although it is not the focus of the study, the implications of such a difference can
be looked at in terms of ‘‘capitalization.’’ Suppose, with all else the same, two
houses sell for $56,000. Assuming the average life of a dwelling to be 50 years
and (given the period in question) a discount rate of 0.08, a $560 difference in
annual property taxes implies almost a $6,900 difference in the values of those
two houses over their lifetimes. This is 12.32% of the average dwelling price,
which is a signiﬁcant difference.20 The odds ratio for the streets variable is 1.953,
indicating that the odds that a house located on a paved street with curb and gutter
will be chosen is 95% higher than a house located on a dirt or gravel road or one
with no gutter or curb. Whether taken individually or together, these ﬁndings
clearly underscore the importance of local public ﬁnance variables on dwelling
location decisions, even in a single taxing jurisdiction.
 Conclusion
The most important difference between this study and other similar studies is that
the focus is on location choice decisions in a single taxing jurisdiction rather than
across a number of cities or even counties. As a result, and using a very detailed
(and conﬁdential) database compiled by the assessor’s ofﬁce, a number of
important locational and ﬁscal variables can be controlled for in the model. The
most important contribution to the literature is to demonstrate the (statistical)
signiﬁcance in household decisions of dwelling-speciﬁc local public ﬁnance
variables even within a single taxing jurisdiction. No discreet choice model of
dwelling choice to date has accounted for such variables. As a matter of fact, the
prevailing assumption in the literature has been to assume that local public ﬁnanceImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  439
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variables (quality of public services and the tax rates) are the same across a city.
The effective property tax rate is the single most important proxy for the average
household’s contribution to the ‘‘price’’ of local public goods within a jurisdiction.
The condition of the streets is the most immediately apparent indicator of the
quality of the services a household receives (or ‘‘purchases’’) from the local
government in return. The results show that both are signiﬁcant determinants of
the household location decisions and, therefore, have to be included in such
discrete choice models. Omitting such variables will be a source of speciﬁcation
error leading to biased results.
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(1991). In addition, Pollakowski (1982) studied the impact of commuting costs, search
costs and expected moving costs on residential choice across census tracts in the San
Francisco Bay area. Some discrete choice models have focused on racial sorting across
urban housing markets such as block groups, census tracts, counties, or Public Use Micro
Areas (PUMAs) (e.g., Gabriel and Rosenthal, 1989; Bajari and Kahn, 2001; and Bayer,
McMillan and Rueben, 2002).
3 Most authors treat census tracts as neighborhoods. The location decisions are, therefore,
across such neighborhoods in different cities or counties, each constituting a different
taxing jurisdiction. For example, Chattopadhyay (2000) has 659 census tracts in 103
cities. In Friedman (1981), the study area consists of nine communities. In Nechyba and
Strauss (1998), there are 6 school districts, each coterminous with a municipality.
4 Some studies use nominal municipal tax rates (Chattopadhyay, 2000). Some rely on
effective property tax rates across municipalities (Friedman, 1981). Others introduce
jurisdictional taxes implicitly (e.g., Lerman, 1979; and Nechyba and Strauss, 1996). In
some studies, there is no immediate evidence of such a variable (e.g., Bajara and Kahn,
2001, Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, 2002; and Earnhart, 2002).
5 Since the nominal property tax rate is the same for all the dwellings in a given taxing
jurisdiction, the differences in effective tax rates are due to the assessment errors. Thus,
the statistical signiﬁcance of the effective property tax rate coefﬁcient might imply that
the market expects the assessment errors to prevail.
6 Some inter-jurisdictional discrete choice models use public expenditures as proxies for
the differences in the level and the quality of public services across jurisdictions (e.g.,
Lerman, 1979; Quigley, 1985; Nechyba and Strauss, 1998; and Chattopadhyay, 2000).
The problem with this is that expenditures at best measure inputs, not outputs. Using
such variables might have led to biased statistical results due to simultaneity not
accounted for in these models. For instance, higher expenditures for public safety may440  Uyar and Brown
indeed lower crime rates, making a jurisdiction more attractive; but it is also possible
that higher public safety expenditures may be the result of high crime rates, making a
jurisdiction less attractive. Thus, it is not always clear how the coefﬁcients for
expenditure-based variables should be interpreted. The statistical results may even be
counterintuitive, necessitating ex post explanations [see, for instance, Friedman’s (1981:
353) explanation of the FIRE variable]. Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2002) is the only
inter-jurisdictional discrete choice model that exclusively uses what are commonly
accepted as ‘‘output’’ variables, namely, school math scores and crime rates, across
counties.
7 Earnhart (2002) applies the discrete choice model to a single taxing jurisdiction.
However, there are no tax or public service variables in his model. His focus is on the
impact of ‘‘natural features’’ on household location and his contribution is in combining
revealed preference and stated preference data in his empirical work.
8 The model is based on the random utility model (RUM) framework (for details, see
McFadden, 2001). For more details on the MNL and NMNL, see McFadden (1978).
Empirical applications can be found in, among others, Lerman (1979), Friedman (1981),
Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), Chattopadhyay (2000), Bajari and Kahn
(2001), Bayer, McMillan and Rueben, (2002) and Earnhart (2002). For a succinct
overview, see Maddala (1996: 67–78) and McFadden (2001).
9 Only for notational convenience, the Xi vector is speciﬁed to also include a variable for
‘‘non-housing income’’ for each household. This represents the portion of income after
dwelling-related expenditures. As explained later, it is deﬁned to vary across dwellings.
10 The study period is1984–1985. A substantial portion of the database comes from the
assessors’ records. As is well known, most but not all the data gathered by the assessors
are open to the public. In this case, the non-public information was made available on
the promise that the name and the location of the city as well as the identities and the
street addresses of the property owners would be kept conﬁdential. The records had data
on variables that assessors in general do not collect. They include the school zone for
each dwelling, whether a dwelling is in the ﬂood zone, the actual property tax liability
and the condition of the street on which a dwelling is located. The authors know of no
other assessors’ records that contain information on some of these variables. The
objective in this paper is not to study a particular time period. The objective is to test
for the statistical signiﬁcance of local public ﬁnance variables within a single taxing
jurisdiction, which no other discrete choice model has done. This data set provides a
unique opportunity to do so.
11 For the dwellings sold during the ﬁrst and the last months of the study period, the
‘‘transaction windows’’ are deﬁned to be two months. For the dwellings sold during the
ﬁrst month, the second month is the month after; for the dwelling sold during the last
month of the study, it is the month before. The only other author who explicitly addresses
this issue is Earnhart (2002).
12 Following the literature, the mortgage payments were computed by assuming a 30-year
mortgage at the FHA rate in effect at the time a house was sold (e.g., Nechyba and
Strauss, 1998, among others.) Household income was computed by assuming a front-
end affordability ratio of 25% (Corgel, Smith and Ling: 525–27). Thus, the measure of
household income is really a proxy for the threshold income needed to qualify for the
chosen house. Home insurance ﬁgures are the ‘‘Direct Home-Guard Rates’’ offered at
the time by one of the largest insurers in that state and city.
13 For each school, the score variable is computed by taking the average of the median
reading and math scores on the 6th grade Iowa Tests of Basic Skills over a three-yearImpact of Local Public Services and Taxes  441
JRER  Vol. 27  No. 4 – 2005
period. As Rosen and Fullerton (1978: 438) state: ‘‘whether or not (these scores) reﬂect
school quality is not the issue. The question is whether or not they represent perceived
quality of education better than’’ another variable such as school expenditure per pupil.
14 Assessor’s records include both the 100-year and the 500-year-ﬂood zones as one
category.
15 ‘‘Income’’ itself does not vary across the dwelling choices facing a household but ‘‘net’’
income does because property taxes, insurance premiums, principle and ﬁnance charges
are speciﬁc to dwellings. Therefore, for a given household, net income for the dwelling
chosen is different than it is for the dwellings not chosen.
16 The formula for the accessibility index is: Ai   (Sj/dij) /
jSj, where Ai is the access
j ij
index for dwelling i, Sj is the (average for two years) of taxable sales at the j
th shopping-
entertainment-employment center and dij is the straight line distance from the midpoint
of the block where dwelling i is to the j
th center. Taxable sales data were provided by
the State Tax Department. For more detail on this and other access indices, see Song
(1996).
17 As seen in Exhibit 2, the school zone dummies, the score and the basement variables
are all statistically insigniﬁcant. Thus, the model was also estimated without these
variables. The log likelihood ratio was 606.44, and chi-square 705.83 with a p-value
of .0001. These are virtually the same as the aggregate results reported at the bottom
of Exhibit 2. Of the individual variables, the level of signiﬁcance of the garage variable
changed from 5% to 10%; the levels of signiﬁcance for the basement*near river and
access variables changed from 10% to 5%. There was no change in the levels of
signiﬁcance of the other variables from those reported in Exhibit 2. Finally, the same
model as in Exhibit 2 was estimated but without the score variable to avoid possible
collinearity with the school zone dummies. Again, the results were virtually the same
as those reported in Exhibit 2.
18 The authors thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
19 Allison, 1999, p. 29 (italics in the original). Also see Ibid, p. 165.
20 The formula is K  t ((1  r)
T  1)/r(1  r)
T , where K is the net present value, t
is the difference in the effective property tax rates of two identically priced dwellings,
r is the discount rate and T is the lifetime of a dwelling.
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